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ABSTRACT
Discussions about the use and derivation of pluripotent human embryonic
stem cells are a stumbling block in developing public policy on stem cell
research. On the one hand there is a broad consensus on the benefits of
these cells for science and biomedicine; on the other hand there is the
controversial issue of killing human embryos. I will focus on the compro-
mise position that accepts research on spare embryos, but not on research
embryos (‘discarded-created-distinction’, from now on d-c-d). I will point
out that this viewpoint is hard to maintain. The main reason is that the
‘revealed beliefs’ of its defenders are inconsistent with their ‘professed
beliefs’, more specifically with their main argument, i.e. the potentiality
argument. I will point out that (1) the defenders of d-c-d actually grant
a relative moral status to the human embryo, (2) this moral status is
dependent on internal and external criteria of potentiality, (3) potentiality
seen as a variable value that also depends on external criteria cannot
justify d-c-d, and (4) an approach to human embryonic stem cell-research
that would also allow the use of research embryos is more compatible with
the feelings, attitudes and values of those who currently defend d-c-d and,
therefore, could lead to a broader consensus and to actions that alleviate
 
individual human suffering.
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INTRODUCTION
Stem cells are unspecialised cells that have the capacity for
unlimited or prolonged self-renewal, and for producing cells of
one or several specific and differentiated types. Although stem cell
research is still largely in the experimental stages,
 
1
 
 there is consen-
sus that its prospects look very promising. They could be used for
various purposes in basic science
 
2
 
 as well as for clinical applica-
tions, primarily for creating new therapies by stem cell culture and
the control of differentiation. There are at present three main lines
of research:
 
3
 
 (1) research on adult stem cells (ASCs) obtained from
organs and tissues of organisms after birth, (2) research on embry-
onic stem cells (ESCs), derived from embryos produced by IVF,
either in the context of fertility treatment (spare embryos) or
embryos created solely for research purposes, and (3) research on
ESCs obtained through somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT
 
4
 
)
 
1
 
Health Council of the Netherlands. 2002. 
 
Stem cells for tissue repair; research
on therapy using somatic and embryonic stem cells.
 
 The Hague: Health Council of
the Netherlands: 14, 17. Some types of stem cells, such as those derived from
bone marrow and skin, have already been used in therapies. Others are effec-
tively being used in trials, for example foetal midbrain cells for Parkinson’s
disease, and pancreatic duct cells for diabetes. R. Lovell-Badge. The future for
stem cell research. 
 
Nature
 
 2001; 414: 88.
 
2
 
Stem cells could be used (a) to gain a better understanding of the devel-
opment process and the underlying mechanisms regulating stem cell growth,
migration, purpose and differentiation in animals and humans, (b) to create
better models of human diseases by using stem cells in laboratory animals, (c)
to culture specific differentiated cell lines to be used for pharmacology studies
and toxicology testing and to do research on the immunology of stem cells and
(d) to learn about the functions of certain genes and proteins.
 
3
 
Other lines of research make use of pluripotent stem cells from the gonads
of aborted foetuses and somatic stem cells from foetal organs and tissues and
from the umbilical cord blood. Scientists are also experimenting with par-
thenotes and stem cells from chimeras (e.g. creation of embryos from unfertil-
ised eggs from macaques. B.A. Maher. The Stem Cell-Cloning Plot Thickens. 
 
The
Scientist
 
 2002; 16 (4): 19; N. Wade. Stem Cell Mixing May From Human-Mouse
Hybrid. 
 
The NY Times
 
 27
 
th
 
 Nov. 2002), hybrid embryos, 
 
i.e.
 
 mixtures of embryos
that would ordinarily be discarded because of their low quality (G. Kolata.
Hybrid Embryo Mixture May Offer New Source of Stem Cells For Study. 
 
The NY
Times
 
 4
 
th
 
 June 2002) and carcinoma cells (P.J. Donovan, J. Gearhart. The end of
the beginning for pluripotent stem cells. 
 
Nature
 
 2001; 414: 92–97).
 
4
 
In therapeutic cloning, an embryo is created by introducing the nucleus of
a somatic cell from the patient into an enucleated (donor)egg, so that, in the
blastocyst stage (when the embryo is like a microscopic ball of about 100–200
cells), pluripotent cells that are genetically identical to the cells of the patient’s
body can be harvested from the inner cell mass and cultured. When they are
introduced into the patient’s body they will not be rejected as foreign.
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commonly designated therapeutic cloning.
 
5
 
 The latter are called
research embryos.
 
6
 
Embryonic stem cells are considered to be the most promising
stem cells for work on certain specific therapeutic and research
aims.
 
7
 
 They seem to be more easy to isolate, can be induced to
divide relatively rapidly in the laboratory and, most importantly,
they are pluripotent. This means that they can be expanded
seemingly indefinitely in culture, maintain a normal karyotype
and have the potential (theoretically) to generate any cell type in
the body.
 
8
 
 This seems to be less true of ASCs.
 
9
 
 There is also a
wealth of knowledge about the characteristics and potential of
animal ESCs. Embryonic germ cells (EGCs) from the aborted
foetus have pluripotent capacities as well,
 
10
 
 but these cells appear
at a later stage of development, which makes them less practical
to work with.
 
11
 
Discussions about the use and derivation of pluripotent hESCs
are a stumbling block in developing public policy on stem cell
research.
 
12
 
 On the one hand there is a large consensus on the
potential advantages of these cells; on the other hand there is the
controversial issue of killing human embryos. The embryo debate
has become very topical again. It has been argued that ther-
apeutic cloning is ethically more controversial
 
13
 
 than the use of
 
5
 
The President’s Council on Bioethics uses instead the term ‘cloning-for-
biomedical-research’. So called reproductive cloning is referred to as ‘cloning-
to-produce-children’. The President’s Council on Bioethics. 2002. 
 
Human
Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry.
 
 Washington, D.C.: PBC.
 
6
 
Some people consider cells that result from SCNT not to be ‘embryos’.
 
7
 
Health Council of the Netherlands, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 1, 28; Lovell-Badge, 
 
op. cit.
 
note 1, 88–91.
 
8
 
Donovan, Gearhart, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 3.
 
9
 
Other difficulties with ASCs: (1) some adult tissues may not contain stem
cells, (2) those that do are not always readily accessible, and (3) it is not yet
proven whether the stem cells found in somatic tissue are truly stem cells and
whether they can proliferate 
 
ex vivo.
 
10
 
M.J. Shamblott, J. Axelman, I.W. Littlefield et al. Human embryonic germ
cell derivatives express a broad range developmentally distinct markers and
proliferate extensively in vitro. 
 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
 
 2001; 1: 304–313.
 
11
 
National Institutes of Health. 2002. Stem Cells: A Primer. Available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/primer.htm.
 
12
 
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the
European Commission. 2000. 
 
Adoption of an Opinion on Ethical Aspects of Human
Stem Cell Research and Use.
 
 Paris: EGE, 15.
 
13
 
Most advisory or regulatory bodies argue for a temporary ban on thera-
peutic cloning. See, for example, Health Council of the Netherlands, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note
1, 17; PCB, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 5; EGE, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 12, 16. In France, where it is
forbidden to create research embryos by IVF, a majority of the CCNE is in favour
of  controlled  authorization  of  engagement  in  therapeutic  cloning,  but  there
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research embryos created by IVF, and that the use of stem cells
from spare embryos is most widely accepted. We may ask ourselves
what makes these methods of derivation so controversial and how
it is that they can be placed in a sort of ‘hierarchy of ethical
acceptability’. Analysing this hierarchy is important because it
may influence public policy
 
14
 
 and is reflected in a variety of
political compromises concerning stem cell regulation. I will
return to these points below.
THREE POSITIONS ON HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM 
CELL RESEARCH
Regarding views on the use and derivation of hESCs, we can
distinguish three main groups, two of which are diametrically
opposed to each other:
First, there are the opponents of so-called destructive embryo
research. They radically oppose research with hESCs. In their
opinion, the embryo needs to be protected as a human being, a
person from the moment of conception. Killing an embryo is like
killing an innocent person and cannot be justified by any alleg-
edly desirable consequences. I am not going to deal with their
arguments in this paper.
 
15
 
A second position, diametrically opposed to the first, claims
that the early embryo deserves no more respect than any other
isolated human tissue. In their opinion, embryos, regardless of
their origins, may be used for scientific research on condition that
the embryos used in the experiments will not later be implanted
in the womb.
 
16
 
Between these polar positions, there are a range of viewpoints
which attempt to articulate at least some grounds for restraint in
the use of hESCs. We could call this ‘the intermediate position’,
because its advocates seem to search for a ‘happy medium’
between the two ‘extreme’ views. Most legislations, regulations
 
remains much resistance from a group which may not be dominant in number,
but which apparently is given much consideration in policy decisions. Comité
Consultatif National d’Ethique. 2000. 
 
Avis N
 
∞
 
67 sur l’avant-projet de révision des
lois de bioéthique.
 
 Paris. CCNE: 10.
 
14
 
S. Holm. Going to the roots of the stem cell controversy. 
 
Bioethics
 
 2002;
16(6): 506.
 
15
 
I deal with their arguments in K. Devolder. The Embryonic Stem Cell
Debate: Steered Toward Foregone Principles and Conclusions? in Human
Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Asian Bioethical Reflections in Dialogue with
the West. Shui Chuen Lee, ed. (at press). Dordrecht. Kluwer Academics Press.
 
16
 
Unless, of course, the research has therapeutic value for the embryo itself,
and thus for the person that will eventually result from it.
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and advices on ESC-research adopt this middle-position, which
is clearly a compromise. It has two main versions which, from
an ethical point of view, partly overlap. Stem cell policy in the
US, for example, is based on the so-called ‘use-derivation-
distinction’.
 
17
 
 A moral distinction is made between the 
 
derivation
 
of the SCs and thus the ‘killing’ of the embryo on the one hand,
and the 
 
use
 
 of these cells for research on the other. The central
issue here is to which extent the researchers who use the embry-
onic stem cells are morally responsible for killing these embryos.
I will not deal with this version of the intermediate position in
this paper.
 
18
 
 The compromise position I will focus on is based on
the ‘discarded-created-distinction’ (d-c-d). People who defend
this view make a moral difference between using 
 
spare embryos
 
 or
 
research embryos
 
. The latter is considered to be unethical.
THE DISCARDED-CREATED-DISTINCTION
I will focus on one version of the intermediate position, namely
on those who defend the discarded-created-distinction, i.e. those
who accept research on 
 
spare embryos
 
, but disapprove, under all
circumstances,  of  the  creation  of  embryos  solely  for  research
(a view also shared by those who defend the use-derivation-
distinction). In most European countries and ethics committees,
this version of the intermediate position is being defended. It is
thought to be very convincing by many people, because it seems
to offer a ‘happy medium’, which could lead to ethical consensus.
I want to point out that it is hard to find a theoretical justification
for this viewpoint. The main reason is that there is inconsistency
between the revealed beliefs (i.e. beliefs revealed by one’s actions
or omissions) of its defenders and their professed beliefs, more
particularly their main argument, i.e. the potentiality argument.
I will point out that the defenders of d-c-d, seemingly unknow-
ingly, grant a 
 
relative
 
 moral status to the human embryo based on
both internal and external criteria of potentiality. I will argue that
potentiality seen as a 
 
variable
 
 value that takes others’ intentions
into account, cannot justify d-c-d. Finally, I will argue that an
approach to hESC-research that accepts the creation of human
embryos for research purposes is more compatible with the feel-
ings and attitudes of the defenders of d-c-d and with widely shared
 
17
 
R.M. Green. 2001. The Human Embryo Research Debates. New York.
Oxford University Press: 156.
 
18
 
For an evaluation of this argument, I refer to R.M. Green. Benefiting from
‘evil’; an incipient moral problem in human stem cell research. 
 
Bioethics
 
 2002;
16(6): 544–556.
 172 KATRIEN DEVOLDER
 
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005
 
values and, therefore, could lead to a broader consensus and to
actions that increase human well-being and alleviate individual
human suffering.
RESEARCH ON SPARE EMBRYOS: PROS
The arguments put forward by the defenders of d-c-d to allow
research on 
 
spare embryos
 
 are based on the following principles:
The 
 
principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence
 
,
 
19
 
 which state that
it is right to benefit people if we can, and wrong to harm them.
The 
 
principle of proportionality
 
,
 
20
 
 as related to hESC-research,
states that human embryos can only be used for research if this
serves an important purpose, such as a major health interest. In
its recommendations on stem cell research, the NBAC expressed
it this way: “In our view, the potential benefits of the research
outweigh the harms of the embryos that are destroyed in the
research process”.
 
21
 
The 
 
principle of subsidiarity
 
,
 
22
 
 related to hESC-research, states
that the derivation of ESCs from spare embryos is only ethically
justified if there is no suitable and less controversial alternative
means of achieving the purpose of the research. Opponents of
ESC-research, for example, claim that there are sufficient alter-
natives, including xenotransplants, EGCs and ASCs and that this
proves the superfluity of hESCs.
 
23
 
 Others – including those who
work with ASCs – have indicated that these sources can be valu-
able but don’t eliminate the need for ESCs. They are arguing for
the right to conduct research with all stem cell types.
 
24
 
19
 
See for example National Bioethics Advisory Commission. 1999. 
 
Ethical
Issues in Human Stem Cell Research.
 
 Vol. I. Rockville, Maryland. NBAC: iv. See also
Commission of the European Communities. 2003. 
 
Commission Staff Working
Paper: Report on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research.
 
 Brussels. European Commis-
sion: 9.
 
20
 
Ibid.
 
 See also Health Council of the Netherlands, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 1, 46.
 
21
 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 19, 56.
 
22
 
Health Council of the Netherlands, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 1, 46.
 
23
 
For example, lobby groups in the USA, such as the 
 
Coalition of Americans
for Research Ethics
 
. At a US Senate hearing, this group passed out a flyer entitled:
Current Clinical Use of Adult Stem cells to Help Human Patients. On the front
it lists a dozen ailments, including auto-immune diseases, anaemia and cancer,
all of which have been treated with stem cells derived from mature tissue. At the
bottom, the flyer reads: “Other side of page: complete list of conditions for
which embryonic stem cells are in clinical use to help human patients.” The
other side is blank. What the flyer says is true, but it is also misleading. Adult
bone marrow cells have been used for more than a decade, whereas hESCs were
isolated and cultured for the first time in 1998.
 
24
 
G. Vogel. Can Adult Stem Cells Suffice? 
 
Science
 
 2001; 292: 1820–1822;
Health Council of the Netherlands, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 1, 47.
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The 
 
principle of the avoidance of waste
 
 is expressed very clearly by
President Bush in his speech on 8
 
th
 
 August 2001 on US stem cell
policy: “If these [frozen spare embryos] are going to be destroyed
anyway, shouldn’t they be used for a greater good, for research
that has the potential to save and improve other lives?”
 
25
 
 Many
argue that creating spare embryos is a ‘side effect’ of a procre-
ation process and we should allow couples to donate them for
good purposes instead of wasting their potential. It does not alter
their final disposition. The underlying idea is that, other things
being equal, it is better to do something good than to do nothing
good, and that, following from this, it must be better to make
good use of something than to allow it to be wasted.
 
26
 
These are all valuable principles. Surely it is more ethical to
help people, other things being equal, than to help no one. And
surely the research has to serve an important purpose. But none
of these principles is sufficient to justify d-c-d. If someone uses
them, we know that they have no objection to the use of 
 
spare
embryos
 
, but it does not necessarily follow that they are against the
creation of 
 
research embryos
 
. It is, for example, perfectly possible to
argue against the waste of spare embryos while at the same time
considering the creation of embryos solely for research as ethi-
cally acceptable (on the condition that the same goal cannot be
reached by the use of spare embryos). The same is true for the
other principles. The question we have to ask ourselves is what
exactly makes it unethical to create embryos solely for research.
Why is doing research on research embryos from an ethical point
of view ‘worse’ than research on spare embryos?
THE CREATION OF RESEARCH EMBRYOS: CONS
 
The instrumentalisation of the embryo and the violation of 
human dignity
 
The main argument put forward by the supporters of d-c-d is that
by the creation of research embryos we ‘instrumentalise’ human
 
25
 
President’s  Statement  on  Funding  Stem  Cell  Research.  Available  at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html. Presid-
ent Bush, however, ultimately rejects the principle of the avoidance of waste. He
banned federally funded labs from using frozen spare embryos as a source of
new stem cells.
 
26
 
J. Harris. 2002. The ethical use of human embryonic stem cells. In Pro-
ceedings of the Third International Conference of Bioethics: Ethics, Legal and
Social Issues in Human Pluri-potent Stem Cells Experimentation. S.C. Lee, ed.
National Central University. Chungli, Taiwan ROC: C-20.
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life, and, following from this, ‘violate human dignity’. Creating
embryos solely for research purposes is, according to this opinion,
an act in which the embryo is not treated with the appropriate
respect a form of human life is entitled to, because it is used
merely as a means to an end.
In the opinion of the defenders of d-c-d, the embryo merits
respect as a form of human life, but the fact that they allow certain
practices implies that they are, often unknowingly, convinced that
its right to protection depends on other values and interests than
the embryo’s right to life. This is evidenced by the fact that they
approve of the creation of spare embryos and research on them.
If embryos are being created to help infertile people (or people
who make use of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis), there is no
good reason to forbid the creation of embryos to help ill or
injured people. In both cases embryos are used as a means to
alleviate human suffering and increase human well-being. Here
again, the argument of instrumentalisation without further expla-
nation is not sufficient to justify d-c-d. It is not a logical conse-
quence that one opposes the use of research embryos. After all,
one can agree that the embryo is instrumentalised in embryo
research without disapproving of this.
 
Instrumentality linked to moral status
 
However, opponents of the creation of research embryos put
forward the following reasoning: the creation of research
embryos is morally wrong because “it goes against the ethical
intuition that the act of creating an embryo for reproduction is
respectful  in  a  way  that  is  commensurate  with  the  moral  status
of embryos, while the act of creating an embryo for research is
not”.
 
27
 
What is meant by 
 
respectful in a way that is commensurate with the
moral status of embryos
 
? Which moral status do the supporters of d-
c-d ascribe to the human embryo and why? It seems that, again,
we cannot avoid the question of the moral status of the embryo.
 
The moral status of the embryo according to the defenders of d-c-d
 
The defenders of d-c-d do not fully consider the embryo as a
person and are consequently of the opinion that we do not have
 
27
 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 19, 53.
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to treat and protect it as a person.
 
28
 
 This is evidenced by the fact
that in countries where d-c-d is defended, the creation of spare
embryos and research on them is allowed, and has even become
common practice.
 
29
 
The supporters of d-c-d do not consider the embryo to be a
person, but are still of the opinion that it merits respect as a form
of human life. Why?
 
Symbolic value of the embryo
 
Some say that because embryos have symbolic value they merit
special respect. However, it is not really the embryo that is at issue
here, but the impact of certain practices on our respect for
human life
 
30 (or on the ‘sanctity of human life’). The relevant
question related to this argument, is whether the creation of
research embryos will weaken our communal respect for human
life in some way that in vitro fertilization or the experimental use
of spare embryos does not?31 I will not go deeper into this issue
here, because I think the following argument is of greater impor-
tance, and is also more conducive to finding another valuable
approach to the hESC-research that is more compatible with the
attitudes of the people who are trying to search for a compromise
between the aforementioned polar positions.
The embryo as a potential person
Another argument put forward very often by defenders of d-c-d
is that embryos merit respect because they are ‘potential human
28 Because early embryos are, in the intermediate view, not considered to be
humans, they cannot be instrumentalised in the Kantian sense. According to
Kant a person is a being, which through its self-awareness is an end in itself and
which, consequently, can never be reduced to the mere status of a means. The
characteristic human dignity that has been cited many times since Kant is not
applicable to the embryo itself.
29 This is also evidenced by the reproductive behaviours of people who
defend the intermediate viewpoint. Many early embryos are lost in ‘normal
reproduction’. An estimate for early embryo loss in normal, healthy women
shows that between two-thirds and three-quarters of all the zygotes do not
proceed to implant themselves in the womb. For references on the various
sources  of  data  concerning  spontaneous  early  embryo-loss  I  refer  to  Green,
op. cit. note 17, N 185.
30 Ibid., 81.
31 For an analysis of the issue of the use of symbolic arguments against the
creation of research embryos, I refer to D.S. Davis. The Kennedy Inst Ethics J 1995;
5(4): 343–354.
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beings’. That is why they consider the creation of spare embryos,
i.e. embryos created for procreation, to be ‘more commensurate
with their moral status’. This seems to express something which
is intuitively certain and acceptable and which opens the way to
ethical consensus. But the expression ‘the embryo is a potential
person’ is vague. This is evidenced by its use to defend opposing
views on embryo research.32 If one chooses to use it, one has to
explain what is meant by it and why it can serve as an argument
to defend a certain position. One cannot singularly appeal to the
fact that an embryo could become a person to give the protection
we give to humans. Since the development of SCNT, every somatic
cell  of  the  human  body  is,  in  this  sense,  a  potential  person.
A necessary condition for the realization of this potential is the
application of the nuclear transfer technique.33 Here we have
come to a very important and useful aspect of the concept of
potentiality: its conditions.
THE POTENTIALITY ARGUMENT
Potentiality and its conditions
The only thing on which everyone agrees concerning the mean-
ing of ‘potentiality’ is that something that is potential is not actual,
but can become actual under certain conditions. These conditions
can depend on internal and external factors. With regard to the
‘embryo as a potential person’, the internal factors are the char-
acteristics of the embryo itself (e.g. its genetic constitution, its
developmental potential). The external factors could be both in
the genesis of the embryo (e.g. the application of SCNT) as well
as beyond (e.g. being chosen to be implanted in the womb,
becoming a spare embryo, being aborted). The external condi-
tions, related to intentions of people, can depend on internal
conditions (we select an embryo because it has characteristics that
make it more ‘healthy’ than another), but do not necessarily do
32 Some hold that the embryo, because it is a potential person, deserves our
full moral respect and protection. The concept of ‘potential person’ is then used
as a step in the argumentation for the prohibition of so called destructive
embryo research. Others (e.g. CCNE) use the same expression to forbid embryo
research, except under certain conditions, while some members of the Belgian
Consultative Bioethics Committee use it to defend the legalization of embryo
research.
33 J. Savulescu. 2001. Should we Clone Human Beings? Cloning as a source
of tissue transplantation. In Cloning: Responsible Science or Technomadness.
M. Ruse and A. Sheppard, eds. New York. Prometheus Books: 220.
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so (they can be based on other intentions, e.g. a woman who does
not want a child). The opponents of hESC-research only take into
account the internal factors and are of the opinion that the moral
status of the embryo can only be deduced from the characteristics
of the embryo itself, i.e. from its ontological structure.34 They see
the potentiality principle as purely interior. What matters is that
‘in the normal course of events’ the embryo develops into a
person. Whether or not it will actually become one makes no
difference for the protection we have to give it.
The defenders of d-c-d also grant a moral status to the embryo
on the basis of its internal characteristics – they consider the
embryo to be more valuable than any other human tissue or cell
– but in fact they also take into account the external factors of
potentiality, based on people’s intentions. If they do so, they
cannot justify d-c-d on the basis of the potentiality argument. Let
me explain.
Potentiality dependent on internal and external conditions
1. Internal Conditions for Potentiality
With regard to the genesis of the embryo and the internal condi-
tions that have to be fulfilled in order to become a person, we
may ask ourselves what is meant by ‘potentiality’. If the defenders
of d-c-d keep on stressing that the embryo has an intrinsic value,
what exactly do they mean?
They generally mean that all human embryos have something
in common, namely the biological and genetic constitution to
develop into a human being. This is often reflected in the defini-
tion of an embryo; e.g. the Belgian Senate’s Bill on Embryo
Protection  defines  an  embryo  as  a  ‘cell  or  cohesive  system  of
cells with the capacity to develop into a human being’.35 Because
of  this  potential,  the  argument  goes,  the  embryo  deserves
special respect. There exist various interpretations of the concept
of ‘potentiality’.36 Some see it as an ‘all-or-nothing’ matter.
Potentiality is then interpreted as the capacity to ‘become’ or to
34 M. Reichlin. The argument from potential: a reappraisal. Bioethics 1997:
11(1): 1–23.
35 Belgian Chamber of Representatives. Dec 2002. Bill Concerning Research
on Embryos In Vitro.
36 I only mention the ‘general’ interpretations of potentiality. Going deeper
into the variety of other interpretations and their nuances would lead me too
far from the aim of this paper.
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‘produce’37 something, in virtue of the operation or expression
of its inherent, physical properties, and given circumstances that
make the operation or expression of these properties possible.38
Whether or not the embryo actually becomes a person, is not
relevant to the protection we have to give it. The potential of the
embryo cannot ‘unfold’ or diminish,39 it can only be frustrated.40
A similar view is what we might call the possibility view in which
the potentiality of an embryo to become a person is seen as the
possibility that its development into a person will, or would under
favourable conditions, occur in the future.41 Reason for protec-
tion are not the present potentialities, but future outcomes.42
Killing an embryo is not a violation of some right of the embryo,
but  of  the  person  into  which  the  embryo  may  develop.  Others
see potentiality as a matter of degree. They acknowledge a link
between potential and (inherent) probability.43 The more prob-
able it is that an embryo will become a person, the more protec-
tion it should get. We can distinguish certain factors playing a part
in the probability that an embryo develops into a person, e.g. (1)
the extent of resemblance to the human bodily form; (2) the
37 See for example S. Buckle who considers the potential to become as a
specific case of the potential to produce. The former he defines as ‘developmental
potential’: the power of an entity to undergo changes to itself. The entity
preserves some form of individual identity. The potential to produce does not
require that any form of identity be preserved, neither is its application limited
to individuals. S. Buckle. 1990. Arguing from the potential. In Embryo Experi-
mentation –  Ethical,  Legal  and  Social  Issues.  P.  Singer,  H.  Kuhse,  S.  Buckle,
K. Dawson, P. Kasimba. Victoria, Australia. Cambridge University Press: 90–180.
38 Ibid.
39 According to some, this inherent potential can be present not until a
certain stage of development is reached. R. McCormick, for example, considers
developmental individuation at day 14 as a marker line after which the embryo
has to be fully protected.
40 See for example M. Lockwood. Warnock versus Powell (and Harradine):
when does potentiality count? Bioethics 1988; 2(3): 187–213. See also M. Reichlin
who states that the nature of the embryo is decisive: it possesses from the
moment of conception a perfect human nature. In W. Wolbert. The potentiality
argument in the debate relating to the beginning of personhood. Human Repro-
duction and Genetic Ethics 2000; 6(2): 19–26.
41 See for example Hare’s argument of ‘possibility for future change’. R.M.
Hare. 1993. Essays on Bioethics. London. Oxford University Press: 85.
42 P. Singer, K. Dawson. IVF Technology and the argument from potential.
In P. Singer (et al.), op. cit. note 37, 76–89. See also S. Buckle, op. cit. note 37.
43 See for example John Noonan in J.T. Noonan Jr. 1970. An almost absolute
value in history. In The Morality of Abortion. J.T. Noonan Jr., ed. Cambridge,
Mass. Harvard University Press. See also H.T. Engelhardt Jr. who understands
potentiality in the sense of ‘probability’ and proposes not to speak of “X’s being
a potential Y”, but “of its having a certain probability of developing into Y”
instead. (In W. Wolbert, op. cit. note 40, 19).
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extent of independence or autonomy with respect to a particular
environment (e.g. the womb); (3) the fact that the embryo has
passed some critical and easily identifiable marker event(s) in its
development (individuation, development of the spinal cord,
brain activation, becoming a sentient being, etc.).
According to those who defend the gradual approach of
potentiality44 the value of an embryo increases gradually during
the course of its development. Some of them have a single crite-
rion approach, which means that they choose one of the afore-
mentioned factors in according a moral status to the embryo. For
example, one may be of the opinion that the embryo’s potential
depends on (1) and that, therefore, for example, a nine-week-old
foetus has more value than a 4-week-old embryo, which then has
more value than a six-day-old embryo. Others defend a multi-
criteria approach.45 They are of the opinion that a variety of
criteria  interact  and  work  together  to  lead  to  a  mounting
sense of concern and ultimately to judgments of worthiness-of-
protection. According to them, in determining the status of an
embryo or a foetus at a particular stage of development, we have
to look at all these qualities and their interrelationships. The
greater the number of criteria an embryo or foetus meets, the
closer it comes to being fully protectable. This view has the advan-
tage that it expresses what many people feel intuitively when one
says that an eight-month-old foetus is already more human than
a one-week-old embryo. There is after all a continuous, gradual
development from the zygote to a foetus several months old and
to the newborn baby and beyond, but we can hardly deny that
major changes occur in the course of this development.46
44 Potentiality is not the only way to justify gradualism, but because the aim
of this paper is restricted to the potentiality argument, I think it is unnecessary
to mention all the other arguments.
45 See for example R.M. Green in Green, op. cit. note 17. Mary Anne Warren
also defends a “multi criterial” view of moral status. M.A. Warren. 1997. Moral
Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford. Clarendon
Press.
46 Which status to accord to the 7-month-old foetus is another, and in my
view, more difficult question. But this is not at issue here. I only want to point
out here that a gradualist approach to the moral status of the embryo and the
foetus has the advantage that it is compatible with the attitudes and feelings of
many people and, therefore, may open the way to a broader consensus on the
issue of hESC-research. (Even if two people accept the gradualist view, there may
be differences in viewpoint concerning late termination of pregnancy, but they
will have the same opinion on research on in vitro embryos). It would have better
consequences than the current compromise position which disapproves of the
creation of research embryos.
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But I don’t want to analyse the various views on the intrinsic
value of the embryo in this paper. My point is that, whatever the
criteria are on which the defenders of d-c-d attribute an intrinsic
moral status to the embryo, the fact is that it is hard to justify a
difference in moral status between both spare and research
embryos on the basis of the aforementioned criteria of potential-
ity. Both have the ‘intrinsic capacity’ to develop into a person, and
in both cases this capacity, i.e. this potentiality, will be frustrated
when they are used for research. Furthermore, spare and research
embryos  have  clearly  as  much  or  as  little  chance  of  becoming
a human being. As much, because they both have the intrinsic
possibility of developing into a person under favourable condi-
tions (in both cases, however, this possibility is removed by human
intervention and for research purposes47); and as little in the
sense that both are in vitro embryos which cannot develop into a
person without human intervention.48 With regard to the gradual
view of potentiality, it suffices to say that both spare and research
embryos score equally low on each of the aforementioned criteria
related to probability.
Consequently, with regard to their intrinsic potential, there is
no moral difference between spare and research embryos. So
what can it mean if one says that the creation of spare embryos
is more commensurate with the moral status of embryos?
2. External Conditions for Potentiality: Procreation Project
The following consideration may ‘potentially’ establish a large
consensus among those who consider the creation and use of
spare embryos as ethically acceptable. Whatever the human emo-
tions and opinions in relation to the embryo or the foetus may
be, as soon as it becomes a question of the procreation project of
a parent couple or a single parent, the embryo is experienced as
‘the expected child’ from the beginning of the pregnancy or, in
the case of IVF, of the creation of the embryo in vitro. As we know,
the value people ascribe to the in vitro embryo is variable and rises
considerably as soon as the embryo is actually used in a parental
project and decreases when it is no longer used in such a project.
They are then referred to as ‘spare’, ‘surplus’ or ‘supernumerary’.
This is also demonstrated by the fact that many people forget that
a number of their embryos are still frozen or do not even answer
fertility clinics when asked what should be done with their surplus
47 Analogue to Hare’s view. R.M. Hare, op. cit. note 41, 88.
48 See also P. Singer and K. Dawson, op. cit. note 42.
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embryos.49 Thus it is not the embryo as such that will be the object
of value, but the embryo that is intended to lead to the birth of
the desired child.50 Couples or individuals who create spare
embryos apparently believe that the enhanced chance of a suc-
cessful pregnancy and of fulfilling their wish for a child outweighs
the moral value of each of the embryos.51 This is a very important
finding.
Consider the following thought experiment:
– If we created research embryos by SCNT in a country where
reproductive cloning is allowed, we could grant them the status
of potential persons. But then, for the sake of argument, we
might propose making a random selection of the same percent-
age of spare embryos that become a human52 from the research
embryos and donate them to infertile couples who need a
donor embryo. The percentage of ‘research embryos’ that
becomes a human would then be the same as that of the ‘spare
embryos’ that do, so they would have had the same chance of
becoming a person.53
Which argument would the supporters of d-c-d put forward to
prohibit this proposal.54
49 K. Hammarberg & E.K. Oke. 2000. The impact of changing legislation on
couples with embryos frozen in excess of five years. 16th Annual Meeting of the
European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology. Bologna, Italy
(Abstract P-251).
50 Worthiness-of-protection in such a situation should be understood mainly
as the use of all possible means to facilitate the fertilization, implantation and
further development of the embryo and the foetus, with a maximal guarantee
for the quality of the expected child’s life.
51 HFEA figures show that between August 1991 and March 1999, 53,497
embryos from IVF programs were donated for research compared to the 118
embryos created for research. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology.
Stem cell research. Postnote 2002; 174: 4.
52 In Belgium, 504 of the 14,407 frozen spare embryos become humans, i.e.
3.5%. Oral information, P. Devroey. 1999. The fate of embryos in different cases.
Symposium organised by the Special Interest Group on Ethics of the European
Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE). Cryopreservation
of Human Embryos. Brussels, AZ-VUB. To be correct you would need to donate
more than 3.5% of the research embryos to infertile couples, since only a
fraction implants and goes to term. But that is irrelevant for what I want to point
out.
53 For a similar line of reasoning see J. Savulescu. The embryonic stem cell
lottery. Bioethics 2002; 16(6): 508–529.
54 It is important to know that a common practice in fertility clinics is that
the creation of embryos for infertility treatment is not clearly separated from
the decision to donate the spare embryos for research. Before they start the IVF
treatment, couples have to decide on the destination of the embryos at the end
of the treatment or storage period.
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I think they would not have a sound argument. This is because
the defenders of d-c-d consider early embryos, precisely because
of their low intrinsic value, as a ‘group’ and grant moral status to
them insofar as there is a chance that one of them will become
the desired child. A study of infertile couples in Belgium shows
that 92% of those who freeze embryos as part of their fertility
treatment approve of the eventual destruction of their surplus
embryos.55 The findings of Australian studies show that fewer
than 10% of the spare embryos are donated to infertile couples
who need a donor embryo.56 Most of the embryos are discarded.57
One possible line of defence is: unlike a research embryo, a
spare embryo has had a chance of becoming a person and we
have therefore treated it with more respect than the research
embryo. But this will not work either, because in the thought
experiment considered here, spare and research embryos would
have had the same chance of becoming a person.
Apparently, intentional parents are not of the opinion that the
potential to become a human should be realized in every delib-
erately created embryo.58 Many people prefer their embryos to
be used as a means for research, instead of giving them to other
couples. Moreover, if they donate their spare embryos to other
couples, their main motivation is often to help those people who
are in the same unhappy situation as they were before the IVF
treatment was successful. People may of course have feelings of
respect towards each created embryo, because of their intrinsic
potentiality, but that does not mean they cannot be used for good
purposes. There are forms of respect and deference which are
less absolute and which can have gradations. The respect one has
for an entity does not exclude it, provided that a meaningful
argument is presented, from being used as a resource for a goal
which is believed to be important. (Research on cadavers, with
55 Y. Englert. 1998. The Fate of Supernumerary embryos: What do Patients
Think about It? In In Vitro Fertilisation in the 1990’s: towards a medical, social
and ethical evaluation. E. Hildth & D. Mieth, eds. Aldershot. Ashgate: 227–232.
56 Hammarberg and Oke, op. cit. note 49. G.T. Kovacs, S.A. Breheny & J.D.
Melinda. Embryo donation at an Australian university in-vitro fertilisation clinic:
issues and outcomes. MJA 2003; 178(3): 127–129.
57 Oral information. A. Trounson. 2003. Human Embryonic Stem Cells. Lec-
tures in Medicine. Embryonic Stem cells. Organised by the Belgian Faculties of
Medicine. Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy. Brussels.
58 The aforementioned examples show the feelings and attitudes of inten-
tional parents, but they also reflect the revealed beliefs of people who defend
d-c-d, because they approve of these practices. (It is legal and there is, for
example, no social disfavour towards people who have a child by IVF and/or
opt for the (immediate) destruction of their spare embryos).
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the informed consent of the party in question and on the condi-
tion of respectful treatment, is entirely legitimate in most coun-
tries). Early embryonic tissue or cells are respected by ensuring
that they are used with care in research that incorporates substan-
tive values such as alleviation of human suffering. ESC-research
can provide such values. Apparently, the defenders of d-c-d agree
that the intrinsic value of the embryos needs to be balanced
against other needs. Are these attitudes and feelings commensu-
rate with the moral status of the embryo as a potential person?
Yes, if this moral status is considered as variable and based on
internal and external criteria for potentiality.
The finding that the defenders of d-c-d in fact balance their
feelings of respect towards the embryo against other values also
shows that those who try to defend d-c-d by referring to the
‘doctrine of double effect’ have no sound argument. The doc-
trine of double effect argues that one may opt for an action B
with negative consequences if it is impossible to opt for an oblig-
atory action A without immediately opting for B, and on the
condition that (1) the negative consequences are less or equal to
the positive consequences of A and (2) it is the consequences of
A and not B which are intended. Applied to the issue of spare
embryos, action A is the achievement of a pregnancy and action
B is the obtaining of spare embryos. According to the doctrine of
double effect, this would be justifiable if A is intended and B not,
and if A is impossible without having B as a consequence. In the
case of spare embryos, these criteria are met. Action B is, however,
‘making spare embryos’ and not ‘research on spare embryos’.
Experimenting is merely a new action, let’s say C, which must be
justified on another basis. We have seen that the grounds on
which the defenders of d-c-d appear to justify research on
embryos is a consequentialist argument, namely that the respect
we have with regard to the human embryo has to be balanced
against other values and needs.
Widely shared values
Apart from the fact that an approach to hESC-research that allows
the creation of research embryos seems compatible with the atti-
tudes and feelings of the current defenders of d-c-d, this approach
is also compatible with widely shared values, more precisely those
on which they base their argument in favour of research on spare
embryos (see above). An approach which allows research on both
kinds of embryo complies with the principles of beneficence and
non-maleficence. These principles are not applicable to early
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embryos because they are not sentient beings with consciousness
or health. The principles, however, are relevant for the millions
of people who suffer from any kind of disorder that can poten-
tially be treated by hESC-based therapies. It is also compatible
with the principles of subsidiarity and the avoidance of waste.
These are applicable in the sense that one should use spare
embryos before creating embryos for a specific purpose, (1) to
avoid waste and (2) to use equally efficient means that are already
available and are less ethically controversial. It is up to experts in
this matter to come to a decision whether, and under which
circumstances, well-defined research can be conducted with spare
embryos, and to decide under which circumstances it is more
appropriate or necessary to use research embryos. In the current
state of stem cell research a majority of researchers already seems
to acknowledge the need for experiments on both spare and
research embryos.59 The principle of autonomy is applicable to
the procedures of informed consent and to the right of individ-
uals to hand over their own embryos, cells and tissues for scientific
research. The advocates (if they are still so) of d-c-d often use the
argument that many people disapprove of the use of research
embryos, to strengthen their position. I think that, on the con-
trary, a view that allows the creation of research embryos has a
chance of becoming accepted in a society that now defends d-c-
d. People’s current sensibilities are not hurt, or a only little, when
deliberately created embryos not involved in a parental project
are donated for research. At least, certainly not to an extent that
would outbalance the benefits for those people. Better infor-
mation on the possibilities of hESC-research might positively
influence people’s opinion.
59 Any study that begins with gametes or that requires fertilization as an end
point necessitates the use of research embryos (e.g. research on contraceptives,
IVM, etc.). Another reason why research embryos are needed is that some
studies, such as those on the role of certain drugs in birth defects and pediatric
cancers, cannot be conducted without a control population of normal, healthy
embryos. Many of the cryopreserved embryos have cytoplasmatic, chromosomal
or nutritional deficiencies. Green, op. cit. note 17, 74–75. Moreover, research
embryos are needed to study the proliferation and (de)differentiation process
of stem cells. Controlling these processes is a necessary condition for working
with ASCs. According to some, therapeutic cloning offers advantages that cannot
be efficiently obtained by any other means. Here also research embryos are
needed.
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CONCLUSION
The discarded-created-distinction cannot be maintained on the
basis of the potentiality argument. It is my impression that some
prominent people try to find a political solution and steer the
debate to ‘foregone principles and conclusions’60 in order to
convince as many people as possible. This results in forced philo-
sophical constructions that slow down stem cell research.
I suggest we take into account the feelings and attitudes of
advocates of d-c-d. Analysing these feelings and attitudes, it seems
that in general a lot of people have respect and concern for some
kind of protection for embryos and foetuses, but that these feel-
ings seem to diminish when it comes to the early developmental
stages and that they depend on whether or not an embryo is
involved in a parental project. The main argument to defend d-
c-d, namely the fact that creating embryos for research is uneth-
ical because it is not commensurate with their moral status as
potential humans, cannot hold good. I have pointed out that the
expression ‘potential person’, applied without any distinction
regarding the early embryo, is biased, because it does not account
for various external factors, both in the genesis of the embryo as
well as beyond it. I argued that the defenders of d-c-d grant a
variable moral status to the human embryo, based on both inter-
nal and external conditions of potentiality. From this it follows
that whatever their approach to the intrinsic potential of the
human embryo is, since they let the value of an embryo depend
on external criteria – of which the parental project is the one on
which there seems to be a broad consensus – there are no good
reasons for d-c-d. According to their view, both spare and research
embryos are deliberately created embryos, with equally intrinsic
potential, which are not included in a parental project. They
deserve some respect, but they can be used for beneficial pur-
poses. As soon as we allow the destruction of embryos, it does not
really matter in which way they are conceived. Moreover, an inter-
mediate view which grants intrinsic value to the embryo, but
makes no moral difference between the use of research embryos
and spare embryos, seems to be more compatible with the atti-
tudes and feelings, and the revealed beliefs of the advocates of d-
c-d and with widely shared values. And, more importantly, such a
60 See P.R. Wolpe & G. McGee. 2001. ‘Expert Bioethics’ as Professional
Discourse: The Case of Stem Cells. In The Human Embryonic Stem cell Debate.
Science, Ethics, and Public Policy. S. Holland, K. Lebacqz & L. Zoloth, eds.
Cambridge, Massachusetts. MIT Press: 185–196.
186 KATRIEN DEVOLDER
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005
view allows stem cell research to progress, so that treatments can
be developed that will increase human well-being and alleviate
individual human suffering.
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